As Russia intensifies its war against Ukraine in the aftermath of the Crimea bridge explosion and NATO’s push to expand membership to Sweden and Finland, it may be a frightening show of power, but Moscow’s house is in severe disarray and this distraction won’t change that. The Wagner paramilitary mutiny, though it failed, will have major repercussions far beyond Russia’s borders. This isn’t just about how useful Prigozhin has been in fighting the war in Ukraine (or, conversely, how disorganized and ineffective the Russian military establishment has been). This is about Prigozhin’s influence in far-flung Russian footholds, including geopolitical hotspots such as Syria, Libya, and Sudan.
So, what happens now in Syria, where Prigozhin actually owns oil assets as part of his ‘payment’ for off-the-book mercenary services in the Kremlin’s interest? What happens in Libya, where the game of external forces and alliances is shifting while rival Libyan governments are no closer to a resolution that could stave off another civil war; and where General Haftar’s forces (supported by Wagner) are poised to pounce on export terminals to blockade oil again? What happens in Sudan?
We have to remember that Prigozhin is not just a force butting heads with Putin; he is a global force. In Sudan, Prigozhin all the military (mercenary) assistance the former regime of President Omar al-Bashir received from Russia was paid for…
As Russia intensifies its war against Ukraine in the aftermath of the Crimea bridge explosion and NATO’s push to expand membership to Sweden and Finland, it may be a frightening show of power, but Moscow’s house is in severe disarray and this distraction won’t change that. The Wagner paramilitary mutiny, though it failed, will have major repercussions far beyond Russia’s borders. This isn’t just about how useful Prigozhin has been in fighting the war in Ukraine (or, conversely, how disorganized and ineffective the Russian military establishment has been). This is about Prigozhin’s influence in far-flung Russian footholds, including geopolitical hotspots such as Syria, Libya, and Sudan.
So, what happens now in Syria, where Prigozhin actually owns oil assets as part of his ‘payment’ for off-the-book mercenary services in the Kremlin’s interest? What happens in Libya, where the game of external forces and alliances is shifting while rival Libyan governments are no closer to a resolution that could stave off another civil war; and where General Haftar’s forces (supported by Wagner) are poised to pounce on export terminals to blockade oil again? What happens in Sudan?
We have to remember that Prigozhin is not just a force butting heads with Putin; he is a global force. In Sudan, Prigozhin all the military (mercenary) assistance the former regime of President Omar al-Bashir received from Russia was paid for in lucrative pieces of the country’s natural resources pie (oil, gas, gold, etc). The ouster of al-Bashir in 2019 has wrong-footed Moscow (and Prigozhin) and today’s civil war is partly an attempt to recover lost assets, some of which were taken away by a new government. In fact, Washington has sanctioned a Russia-based entity called M Invest, which is controlled by Prigozhin and specialized in disinformation campaigns and strategy (for lack of a better word) for al-Bashir to suppress his opponents and control society. M Invest’s subsidiaries include Meroe Gold–and both appear to now be working in the interest of the IRA–the paramilitary group vying for power with the government in a conflict that began on April 15 and has led to the internal displacement of more than 2.6 million people since. More to the point, Wagner is backing the paramilitary group in return for an illicit gold-mining operation that allows it to smuggle gold from Sudan to the UAE, via Libya.
Syria is Wagner’s original stomping ground. It’s ground zero for Prigozhin’s empire. When Prigozhin launched his failed mutiny, the first place Putin looked was Syria, where he had Wagner mercenaries detained at a Russian air base while other Wagner forces were prevented from leaving the country. For Moscow, it was less about detaining Wagner forces than it was about ensuring Syrian leader Bashir Al-Assad that Putin was still in the driver’s seat here.
In Libya, Wagner forces were deployed to support General Haftar in his attempt to take Tripoli in 2020. They failed, but still operate a number of air bases in Libya, which they also use for weapons transfers to Sudan. (But let’s remember that Wagner’s activities in Libya were originally meant to support UAE, Saudi, and Egyptian agendas, and Wagner likely even received funding from the UAE earlier on–as in, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine).
So, the enormous task now ahead of Putin is how to maintain Wagner’s security forces without completely dismantling them and losing major influence in these strategic venues, of which Ukraine is but one.
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