The Houthi Missile Threat To Israel

Israel shot down a Houthi missile over the Red Sea on Monday, employing its Arrow aerial defense system. This follows the US Navy’s shooting down of Houthi missiles fired toward Israel on October 18.

The question now is whether the Houthis are ready to jump into the fray as Hamas allies and risk a full-on return to the Yemen battlefield of the Saudis. Such a move would threaten the Saudi-Iran rapprochement. 

There has been some escalation of Houthi activity in Yemen since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, particularly with the killing of four Saudi soldiers on the Yemen-Saudi border. Last weekend, the Houthis also stated that they had set up a command center to support Hamas against Israel, and have vowed to continue to target Israel until aggression on Gaza is halted.

This, to the mind of many, is a direct indication that Iran will become involved in the escalating Hamas-Israel conflict. However, it is important to understand that the Houthis are not fully controlled by Iran. While Iran has long been using them in a proxy war against the Saudis in Yemen, the Houthis are nonetheless an autonomous group with their own agenda. That is why the Saudi-Iran rapprochement has not necessarily meant peace for Yemen. The conflict has subsided to a significant extent, but it’s left neither the Yemeni government nor the Houthis in full control, largely as a result of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement.

The Houthis are now seeking to take advantage of an opportunity to gain legitimacy, which Israel’s assault on Gaza following the initial Hamas attack affords. For years, the media of the Arab Gulf states has destroyed any credibility the Houthis might have had, but taking up the Palestinian cause could render them more credible in the region. Especially if it’s not directed by Tehran. There is another reason, as well, considering that the Houthis are fully aware that their Israel-aimed Red Sea missiles have little to no chance of posing a serious threat: Washington this week said the Saudis were still willing to work towards normalization of relations with Israel despite Gaza (though Riyadh is not voicing this in the media), and the Houthis are keen to stop that from happening. 

There can be no assumption that Iran will involve itself in the conflict based solely on Houthi actions. That does not, however, put global oil markets at ease. The Houthis are capable of major attacks on Saudi oil installations, as they have done in the past; but targeting Saudi oil does not lend them credibility in the same way that targeting Israel does. Hence, the barrage of missiles over the Red Sea. 

With regards to Iran, U.S. intelligence now assesses Iran is attempting to use its proxies to pressure Israel and its supporters, but ultimately is hoping to avoid direct conflict with Israel. Regardless, this could not be a united Iranian-led action against Israel. The proxies are just that, and Iran has only varying degrees of control over them, from Hamas and Hezbollah to militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. 

And the proxies are indeed busy. On November 2 alone, Hezbollah and other groups backed by Iran launched over two dozen attacks on northern Israel, adding attack drones. Attacks may further escalate on November 3 following Hezbollah leader Nasrallah’s scheduled public speech.