Libya's Election Is All About Oil Money

Libya’s election problem is still all about oil money. 

The fear among those who could lose power in Libya as a result of elections planned for December 24th is now palpable. None of the major power brokers on either side are willing to loosen their grip on power in this oil-rich country. 

The entire premise of the pre-election jockeying is this: The new government will make significant concessions to the east if all the power brokers of the east (including General Haftar) buy into the new unity government in the west. But that means specifically buying into the current government of national unity led by Abd Aldabaiba. Aldabaiba hasn’t officially announced he is running for president in December, but he’s been campaigning clearly and attempting to align the country’s forces around himself, centered on Tripoli. Power brokers in the east aren’t buying it, and that could lead to a dangerous break down in an already fragile pre-election period. 

Again, it’s all about the oil. When Haftar moved to take over Tripoli by first cutting off the oil supply, it was because the east (Benghazi) had no access to oil revenues. When Haftar launched his campaign, Tripoli closed down the bank clearing system. It should have been reopened once Haftar allowed the oil to start flowing again about this time last year. It has not been reopened, which means that the GNU head is still trying to deprive the east of any oil revenues. 

Aldabaiba appears to be backing the eastern powers into a corner. The only way out of that corner - short of Haftar winning the presidential elections - would likely be the same move that Haftar had to resort to in the first half of 2020: Shut off the oil, again. The east isn’t seeing any revenues from the oil, so without any real indication of concessions for the east, they will have nothing else to lose. 

In late September, Haftar announced he would be stepping down from his role as head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) for three months. That signaled he is running for president, though it was accompanied by no such announcement. He named an interim replacement until December 24th, the date of the elections (which still have no constitutionally-based electoral law to make them possible). 

But what we are watching carefully is this maneuver by parliamentary speaker Aguila Saleh (a Haftar ally) on September 9th: Saleh issued a controversial draft electoral law that really had no constitutional basis, yet defined the powers of the next Libyan head of state. Conveniently for Haftar, the draft law makes it possible for a military official to be a presidential candidate. Haftar announced he would temporarily step down from the military, regardless… for three months. But it is all a ruse. With only 70 days to go before Libyan elections, the three most viable scenarios appear to be Haftar as president (which will mean more regional warfare), another oil shut down (which will also mean more regional warfare), or a delay into 2022 to buy more time for power-building on all sides (which will also mean more regional warfare).